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Cost Profiling of Water Infrastructure Projects 14 
Abstract: The expected final budgeted costs of infrastructure assets are often exceeded during 15 
project delivery. Being able to determine the likelihood of changes to the final budget can enable 16 
clients to implement strategies to manage and control costs during construction. To understand the 17 
changing nature of costs, the cost profiles of 1,093 water infrastructure projects that were delivered 18 
by a water utility company are examined. Cost overruns were experienced in 656 projects. Only 1 19 
project was delivered on budget with the remaining 436 being completed under the ‘Final Budget 20 
Approval’. A mean cost overrun and underrun of +19.97% and -32%, were found, respectively. 21 
The ‘best fit’ distribution for cost overruns and underruns for determining their probability of 22 
occurrence were calculated. The research moves beyond examining the cost performance of 23 
heterogeneous datasets that have dominated previous studies to the use of a homogeneous sample, 24 
which enables more reliable contingency forecasts to be determined.  25 
 26 
Keywords: Cost overrun/underrun, contingency, distribution fitting, risk management, water 27 
infrastructure  28 
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Introduction 29 
Water authorities are responsible for constructing, managing, maintaining, and operating a 30 
portfolio of assets.  Projects that are undertaken will usually be prioritized according to their 31 
strategic importance, relative and opportunity cost and the immediate needs of the communities 32 
they will serve. In the United Kingdom (UK), £2.3 billion was invested in water infrastructures 33 
projects between 2013 and the third quarter of 2014 alone (Office of National Statistics, 2014). 34 
Looking ahead, the Scottish Government, for example, will invest £3.5 billion in a strategic 35 
program between 2015 and 2021 to improve water mains and treatments works and to deliver 36 
solutions to around 400 external sewer programs addressing problems associated with flooding 37 
and water quality (Scottish Government, 2014a). The program is estimated to create approximately 38 
5,000 construction jobs and have a significant economic multiplier effect throughout the Scottish 39 
economy. This investment in new capital expenditure (CAPEX) is a significant increase from the 40 
Government’s £1.8billion ‘Quality and Standards II’ investment program, which ended in 2014 41 
(Scottish Government, 2014b).  42  43 
It has been observed that the CAPEX of water infrastructure projects routinely overrun their initial 44 
cost estimates leaving clients, financiers, contractors and the public dissatisfied (Ahiaga-Dagbui 45 
and Smith, 2012; Ahiaga-Dagbui and Smith, 2014a; Baccarini and Love, 2014). This is not an 46 
unusual situation for infrastructure projects in their entirety, as it has been observed that on 47 
average, 48% fail to meet their baseline time, cost and quality objectives (Caravel Group, 2013). 48 
However, if CAPEX overruns, the scope of works on future projects may be reduced to 49 
accommodate the increased expenditure that has been incurred. Contractors could face cash flow 50 
issues, liquidity and damage to their business image while the public, where the project is funded 51 
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by taxpayer’s money, have to pay more for a problem that was not their fault. This may also have 52 
a knock-on effect on the amount of funds that will be available for maintaining and operating the 53 
built facility.  54 
 55 
Surprisingly, despite the propensity for water infrastructure projects to experience cost overruns, 56 
there has been limited use of advanced data modelling and statistical analysis in the industry to 57 
ameliorate decision-making in relation to the management of risk and uncertainty (Baccarini and 58 
Love, 2014). Ahiaga-Dagbui and Smith (2014a) have suggested that all too often risks are either 59 
ignored or dealt with in a completely arbitrary manner using rules-of-thumb or deterministic 60 
percentages. Baccarini and Love (2014) have previously pointed out that the task of risk 61 
management or response in most cases is so poorly performed, that far too much risk is passively 62 
retained, ultimately resulting in cost escalation during project delivery. 63 
 64 
A common probability distribution used by risk analysts who rely on Monte Carlo simulation, for 65 
example, is the Normal (or Gaussian) Distribution (Hubbard, 2009). Such a distribution is used as 66 
it appears to ‘fit’ observed phenomenon from an array of data often found in manufacturing and 67 
actuarial science. Moreover, its use is also assumed to apply to Options Theory (e.g. Black and 68 
Scholes, 1973; Merton, 1973) and Modern Portfolio Theory (Markowitz, 1952; 2005). That said, 69 
according to Hubbard (2009), the use of normal distribution does not necessarily reflect what 70 
actually arises in reality. As the normal distribution is symmetrical and not skewed, the mean is in 71 
the middle. Thus, the standard deviation represents a unit of uncertainty around the mean 72 
(Hubbard, 2009). Yet, not all datasets are normally distributed and bell-shaped and therefore it is 73 
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important for risk analysts to determine the tails of distributions and identify the best fitting 74 
distribution to decide appropriate probabilities of occurrence.  75 
 76 
In this paper, the statistical characteristics of 1,093 water infrastructure projects delivered by a 77 
large public utility company are analyzed to determine their: 78 
 79 
• likelihood and size of cost overruns /underruns arising in future projects; 80 
• empirical distribution of the dataset; and  81 
• ‘best fit’ probability density function (PDF) so that the probabilities of overruns or underruns 82 
can be determined.  83 
 84 
The research presented moves beyond examining the cost performance of heterogeneous datasets 85 
that have dominated previous studies (e.g., Flyvbjerg et al. 2002; Ansar et al., 2014) to the use of 86 
a homogenous sample, which enables more reliable forecasts to be determined. By utilizing a 87 
homogeneous dataset provided by a single asset owner, whose procurement processes, contractual 88 
conditions, and technology are consistently applied to the delivery of their assets, offers a basis for 89 
developing a robust assessment of risk when compared to studies that have focused on deriving 90 
data from disparate projects from around the world (e.g., Ansar et al., 2014).  The research 91 
presented in this paper provides public and private organizations involved in delivering water 92 
infrastructure projects with a platform for benchmarking their cost performance and the ability to 93 
improve their risk management prior to the commencement of construction, maintenance and 94 
operations of their assets. 95 
 96 
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A Review of Cost Performance 97 
For an asset owner, such as a water authority, managing the cost performance of their portfolio of 98 
projects is essential to ensure its competitiveness and survival; this is a critical metric as it 99 
quantifies the cost efficiency of the work completed. Cost performance is generally defined as the 100 
value of the work completed compared to the actual cost of progress made on the project (Baccarini 101 
and Love, 2014). For the asset owner, the ability to reliably predict the final cost of construction 102 
and ensure it does not experience an overrun is vital for ensuring the planning and resourcing of 103 
other projects or those in the pipeline. Put simply, a cost overrun is defined as the ratio of the actual 104 
final costs of the project to the estimate made at full funds authorization measured in escalation-105 
adjusted terms (Merrow, 2011). In this instance, an overrun is treated as the margin between the 106 
authorized initial project cost and the real final costs incurred after adjusting for expenditures due 107 
to escalation terms. Ahiaga-Dagbui and Smith (2014a;b) examined 1,600 water projects in the UK 108 
and found an average cost overrun of 16.75% of the ‘Final Approved Budget’. Contrastingly, the 109 
Baccarini and Love (2014) study of 228 Australian sewer and water projects revealed a slightly 110 
lower mean cost overrun of 13.58%. 111 
 112 
Overruns 113 
There has been a considerable amount of research that has focused on examining the nature of cost 114 
overruns and how they can have an adverse impact on organizations (e.g. Merewitz, 1973; Jahren 115 
and Ashe, 1990; Pickrell, 1992; Hinze et al., 1992; Vidalis and Najafi, 2002; Gritza and Labi, 116 
2008; Ahiaga-Dagbui and Smith, 2012; Ahiaga-Dagbui and Smith, 2014a,b; Love et al., 2015a,b). 117 
According to Ahiaga-Dagbui (2014) two predominant schools of thought have emerged from the 118 
on-going discourse regarding the sources of overruns: (1) ‘Evolution Theorists’, who suggest that 119 
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overruns are the result of changes in scope and definition between inception stage and eventual 120 
project completion (e.g., Odeyinka et al., 2012; Bhargava et al., 2010; Anastasopoulos et al., 121 
2014); (2) ‘Psycho Strategists’ (i.e. a combination of psychological contributors and business 122 
strategy) attribute overruns to deception, planning fallacy and unjustifiable optimism in the setting 123 
of initial cost targets (e.g., Flyvbjerg et al., 2002; Ansar et al., 2014).     124 
 125 
There has been a widespread campaign for using the ‘outside view’ advocated by Flyvbjerg et al. 126 
(2002), which is founded on the notion that optimism bias (i.e. the underestimation of risks and 127 
overestimation of benefits) and strategic misrepresentation (i.e. deception) as they are perceived 128 
to be the key constituents that contribute to cost overruns in projects. While there are grounds for 129 
this argument put forward, the evidence presented lacks credibility and is unscientific; no evidence 130 
of any causal relationship is provided (Love et al., 2012; Love et al., 2015a,b).  Osland and Strand 131 
(2010) have been particularly critical of the ‘outside’ view purported in Flyvbjerg et al. (2002), as 132 
they conclude that they applied the logic of suspicion in their claim that inaccurate cost forecasting 133 
is a result of optimism bias and strategic misrepresentation.  134 
 135 
In support of an ‘inside view’, which focuses on specific planned actions, Love et al. (2012) 136 
suggest that cost overruns arise as a result of a series of pathogenic influences, which lay dormant 137 
within the project system. However, before such influences become apparent, participants often 138 
remain unaware of the impact that particular decisions, practices and procedures can have on 139 
project performance. Accordingly, this school of thought is widely supported by authors such as 140 
Odeck (2004), Aibinu and Pasco (2008) and Odeyinka et al. (2012). Essentially, Love et al. (2012) 141 
and Ahiaga-Dagbui and Smith (2014a) imply from their research that overruns are not really a case 142 
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of ‘projects not going according to plan (budget)’, but ‘plans not going according to project’. That 143 
is, the realities of project delivery, in terms of latent conditions, technical designs, risk profiles or 144 
contingencies, do not always reflect expectations at the planning stage.  145 
 146 
While Love et al. (2012) have been critical of the ‘outside view’ promulgated by Flyvbjerg (2002), 147 
in recent works, Love et al. (2015b) acknowledge that political, economic, psychological and 148 
managerial factors may generate the pathogenic influences that can arise in projects. Subsequently, 149 
Ahiaga-Dagbui (2014) and Love et al. (2015b) have advocated for a ‘balanced approach’ that 150 
focuses on how process and technological innovations can be used to improve the cost 151 
performance of infrastructure projects. Fundamentally, understanding ‘why’ and ‘how’ projects 152 
overrun, from both ‘outside’ and ‘inside’ perspectives, is pivotal to reducing their impact and 153 
occurrence. 154 
 155 
The above discourse provides a brief contextual backdrop for understanding the nature of cost 156 
overruns. A detailed review of the mainstream arguments on the causes of cost overruns can be 157 
found in Ahiaga-Dagbui and Smith (2014a,b) and Love et al. (2015a,b). A recurring theme that 158 
emerges from previous studies is the reference point (i.e. initial budget or contract award) from 159 
where a cost overrun is determined (Love et al., 2013). The reference point used influences the 160 
size of the cost overrun that is reported. Another emergent issue relates to the size of a project; 161 
smaller projects experience greater percentage cost increases than larger ones (e.g. Odeck, 162 
2004a,b). This suggests that larger projects may be better managed and that longer completion 163 
times provide an opportunity to make adjustments to facilitate cost control (Jahren and Ashe 1990; 164 
Odeck, 2004). Despite the accumulated wealth of knowledge that has been acquired about cost 165 
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overruns, their prediction remains a pervasive challenge. This is due to the limited and 166 
heterogeneous sample sizes that have previously been used to determine their statistical 167 
characteristics and distribution profiles. The result, thereof, is inappropriate risk management 168 
strategies and unrealistic levels of construction cost contingency (Baccarini and Love, 2014). 169 
 170 
Research Method 171 
The industry partner that provided the dataset for this research is a utility company in the UK that 172 
provides water and sewerage services to over 2.5 million households and 150,000 business 173 
customers. The collaborating organization typically has three stages of estimation before inviting 174 
bids from contractors – known as the third-stage estimate (i.e. Gate Three). This is usually based 175 
on about 50-60% completed scope design and is used for evaluation of tenders after which detailed 176 
design is carried out by the selected contractor in a sort of design and build contract framework.  177 
 178 
The data collection process involved an initial shadowing of the tendering and estimation 179 
procedure within the organization. The researchers were allowed to be quasi-members of the 180 
tendering team of the company on some of its projects to observe how the estimates were produced. 181 
It was also an opportunity to gain a first-hand understanding of how the data to be used in the 182 
analysis was generated and what different variables meant. The initial dataset used contained 1,600 183 
projects. The scope of these projects varied from construction of major water treatment plants to 184 
minor repairs and upgrade. After the removal of cases with significant missing data and input 185 
errors, the final dataset that was used for the analysis in this paper contained 1,093 water 186 
infrastructure projects, completed between 2002 to 2012. Cost indexing was not considered as only 187 
the percentage cost overrun/underrun as a proportion of the value at contract award was examined. 188 
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To improve risk management in the delivery of future infrastructure projects and determine the 189 
appropriate construction contingency, the statistical characteristics of those that had been 190 
completed were examined and their cost profiles modeled (Baccarini and Love, 2014). In 191 
determining the statistical characteristics of the sample and probability of cost overrun/underruns 192 
being incurred, the ‘cost profiling’ method suggested by Baccarini and Love (2014) is adopted and 193 
presented below. This method is replicated so the results of the study can be compared to the cost 194 
profiling of water infrastructure projects elsewhere. Moreover, profiling projects of the same type 195 
provide the basis for developing the much needed scientific basis for developing standard cost 196 
profiles needed for estimating their performance. The theory is somewhat akin to Prospect Theory, 197 
which is a method of predicting the future, through looking at similar past situations and their 198 
outcomes (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Flyvbjerg and Cowi (2004) build on this work and refer 199 
to it as Reference Class Forecasting (RCF). The key point of departure in this research, however, 200 
resides within the way in which the ‘best fit’ distribution is determined and computed; a Normal 201 
distribution is not assumed. 202 
 203 
Ascertaining the ‘best fit’ probability distribution lies at the heart of cost profiling of infrastructure 204 
projects (Love et al., 2013; Baccarini and Love, 2014; Love et al., 2015a,b). Fundamentally, 205 
probability distributions can be viewed as a tool for dealing with uncertainty: they can be used to 206 
perform specific calculations, and therefore results can improve the effectiveness of decision-207 
making. If an inappropriate distribution is selected, which is misaligned with the nature of the data 208 
used for the modelling, subsequent calculations will, as a result, be questionable. The use of 209 
incorrect probability distributions may also have other serious consequences such as an inability 210 
to complete the projects altogether. Clients may also have to secure additional funding or suffer 211 
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reputational detriments. In addition, financiers may have to suffer the consequences of their 212 
investment not returning profits for a longer period, or not at all. Distribution fitting enables the 213 
development and derivation of valid models of random processes and is therefore used to mitigate 214 
potential cost and schedule overruns that can arise in infrastructure projects, invariably due to 215 
invalid model selection.  216 
 217 
An example where RCF was applied and an inappropriate distribution used was the Edinburgh 218 
Tram and Airport Link project in the UK (Love et al., 2013). The project was originally estimated 219 
to cost £320 million, which included a risk contingency based-estimate (Auditor General for 220 
Scotland and Accounts Commission, 2011). Taking all the available distributional information into 221 
account, by considering a reference class of comparable rail projects (e.g. London Docklands Light 222 
Rail), the reference class estimated an 80th percentile value of £400 million. The project was 223 
completed three years late in the summer of 2014 at a reported construction cost of £776 million 224 
(City of Edinburgh Council, 2014). Considering claims and contractual disputes, which partly 225 
occurred due to errors and omissions in contract documentation, a revised estimated final cost of 226 
over £1 billion has been forecasted, including £228 million in interest payments on a 30-year loan 227 
to cover the funding shortfall (BBC, 2011).  As noted above, RCF has several limitations and the 228 
relative effectiveness of Risk-Based Estimation methods developed has yet to be adequately 229 
demonstrated (Liu and Napier, 2009).  Thus, Love et al. (2015) have suggested that to improve the 230 
reliability of risks in the form of a contingency estimate at ‘Final Approved Budget’, the empirical 231 
distributions of cost overruns need to be examined to determine their ‘best fit’ probability so that 232 
an appropriate construction contingency sum can be determined.  In this case, by determining the 233 
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‘best fit’ probability distribution for the homogenous sample provided, the likelihood of a portfolio 234 
of projects meeting their desired cost performance can be attained. 235 
 236 
Procedure 237 
Descriptive statistics such as the mean (M), standard deviation (SD), skewness, kurtosis and inter-238 
quartile values were calculated for cost data for 1,093 water infrastructure projects delivered in the 239 
UK.  A cost overrun/underrun is determined by the difference between the ‘Final Approved 240 
Budget’ (i.e. contract award) and ‘Final Construction Cost’. A one-way analysis of the variance 241 
(ANOVA) of cost profile (i.e. overruns and underruns) and correlations were undertaken to 242 
examine differences between the size (i.e. in terms of their total approved budget), location (i.e. 243 
North, South, East and West of the region), project type (i.e. general, waste water and water) and 244 
scope (i.e. upgrade, new-build or refurbishment).  To identify where any differences may have 245 
existed within a sample, a Tukey’s honest significant difference (HSD) post-hoc test was used 246 
(Tukey, 1949). 247 
 248 
Noteworthy, ‘general projects’ are ancillary works and include upgrades and health and safety or 249 
environmental compliance or minor repair works. ‘Waste water projects’ refer to the construction 250 
and maintenance of pipework systems and other physical infrastructure required for transporting 251 
or treating effluent from home and industries through a combined or sanitary sewer. ‘Water 252 
projects’ relate to infrastructure works that collect, treat, store and distribute drinking water.  253 
Project schedule was not included in the analysis as there is a proclivity for it to be contained 254 
within a construction program as ‘float’ or ‘slack’. This point has been identified in the research 255 
produced by Baccarini and Love (2014) when they sought to examine the nature of construction 256 
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cost contingency and overruns in water infrastructure projects from a homogenous sample in 257 
Western Australia.  258 
 259 
The PDF and Cumulative Density Functions (CDF) for the difference between the ‘Final Approved 260 
Budget’ and ‘Final Cost’ were computed using the software EasyFit 5 and the probability of an 261 
overrun/underrun being experienced for future projects were identified for this client organization.  262 
A PDF for a continuous random variable, X, between the interval [a, b], can be expressed as the 263 
integral function: 264 
  ∫ 𝑓𝑓(𝑥𝑥)𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥 = 𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎 ≤ 𝑋𝑋 ≤ 𝑏𝑏)𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎       [Eq.1] 265 
 266 
A CDF was also produced. For theoretical continuous distributions, the CDF is expressed as a 267 
curve and denoted by: 268 
 269 
  𝐹𝐹(𝑥𝑥) =  ∫ 𝑓𝑓(𝑡𝑡)𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡𝑥𝑥−∞        [Eq.2] 270 
 271 
The empirical CDF, which is displayed as a stepped discontinuous line and dependent on the 272 
number of bins (𝑛𝑛), is represented by: 273 
 274 
𝐹𝐹𝑛𝑛 (𝑥𝑥) = 1𝑛𝑛 ⋅ [Number of observations ≤ 𝑥𝑥]     [Eq.3] 275 
 276 
The PDF, CDF and distribution parameters such as ( ) were examined for 277 
continuous distributions such as Beta, Burr, Cauchy, Error, Gumbel Max/Min, Johnson SB, 278 
ξσµγβα ,,,,,,, mk
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Normal and Wakeby using their respective estimation methods of Maximum Likelihood Estimates.  279 
Then, using the StatAssist function within EasyFit 5.5, the ‘best fit’ distribution was then 280 
determined using the following ‘Goodness of Fit’ tests, which measures the compatibility of a 281 
random sample with the following theoretical probability distributions:  282 
 283 
• Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic (D):  Based on the largest vertical difference between the 284 
theoretical and empirical CDF: 285 
 286 
𝐷𝐷 =  max1≤𝑖𝑖≤𝑛𝑛 �𝐹𝐹(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖) − 𝑖𝑖−1𝑛𝑛 , 𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 − 𝐹𝐹(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖)�    [Eq.4] 287 
 288 
• Anderson-Darling statistic (A2): A general test to compare the fit of an observed CDF to an 289 
expected CDF. The test provides more weight to distributions tails than the Kolmogorov-290 
Smirnov test. The Anderson-Darling statistic is defined as: 291 
𝐴𝐴2 = −𝑛𝑛 − 1
𝑛𝑛
∑ (2𝑖𝑖 − 1) ∙ �In𝐹𝐹(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖) + In�1 − 𝐹𝐹(𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛−𝑖𝑖+1)��𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1   [Eq.5] 292 
 293 
• Chi-squared statistic (χ2): Determines if a sample comes from a population with a specific 294 
distribution. The Chi-squared statistic is defined as: 295 
  𝑥𝑥2 = ∑ (𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖−𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖)2
𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖
𝑘𝑘
𝑖𝑖=1       [Eq.6] 296 
 297 
where 𝑘𝑘 is a positive integer that specifies the number of degrees of freedom; Oi is the observed 298 
frequency for bin I; and Ei is the expected frequency bin i calculated by: 299 
𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 = 𝐹𝐹(𝑥𝑥2) − 𝐹𝐹(𝑥𝑥1)      [Eq.7] 300 
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 301 
Here, F is the CDF of the probability distribution being tested, and 𝑥𝑥1 , 𝑥𝑥2 are the limits for the bin 302 
i.  303 
 304 
The above ‘Goodness of Fit’ tests were used to test the null (Ho) and alternative hypotheses (H1) 305 
that the datasets: H0 - follows the specified distribution; and H1 - does not follow the specified 306 
distribution. The hypothesis regarding the distributional form is rejected at the chosen significance 307 
level (α) if the statistic D, A2, χ2 is greater than the critical value.  For the purposes of this research, 308 
a 0.05 significance level was used to evaluate the null hypothesis. The p-value, in contrast to fixed 309 
α values, is calculated based on the test statistic and denotes the threshold value of significance 310 
level in the sense that Ho will be accepted for all values of α less than the p-value.  Once the ‘best 311 
fit’ distribution was identified the probabilities for determining a cost overrun/underrun were 312 
calculated using the CDF.  To simulate the samples’ randomness and derive cost overrun and 313 
underrun probabilities, a Mersenne Twister, which is a pseudo-random number generating 314 
algorithm, was used to generate a sequence of numbers that approximated the sample to 5,000 315 
(Matsumoto and Nishimura, 1998). 316 
 317 
Results 318 
Of the 1,093 projects provided by the water authority, it was revealed that 656 projects experienced 319 
a cost overrun, one was delivered on budget and 436 experienced an underrun (Table 1). In Figure 320 
1, the ‘cost performance’ of the entire sample in relation to cost overruns and underruns are 321 
displayed using a Logarithmic scale. In this instance, ‘cost performance’ is the ability of an 322 
organization to ensure its project portfolio for a given period does not exceed the ‘Final Approved 323 
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Budget’. When examining the entire sample the Mean (M) and Standard Deviation (SD) were 324 
found to be -0.77% and 41.52% respectively. Further analysis of the sample by project size 325 
revealed that the M and SD varied significantly, as displayed in Figures 2 and 3. A one-way 326 
ANOVA was used to test the ‘cost performance’ for the sample per annum for differences. 327 
Notably, for any given year a project was undertaken, Levene’s test of homogeneity of the 328 
variances was found not to be violated (p < 0.5), which indicated the population variances for each 329 
group of project size were equal.  330 
 331 
Cost overruns and underruns were extracted from the main sample to obtain an informed 332 
understanding of their characteristics. In fact, the statistical characteristics of cost underruns have 333 
been generally ignored in the normative literature. Thus, it was considered pertinent in this instance 334 
to promulgate their statistical characteristics. Considering the distribution of the samples presented 335 
in Figure 2 and 3, is there a difference between project size and cost overruns and underruns? A 336 
one-way ANOVA was used in this instance to test for differences. In the case of overruns, Levene’s 337 
test of homogeneity of the variances was found to be violated (p < 0.5), which indicated the 338 
population variances for each group of project size were not equal. The ANOVA revealed 339 
significant differences between the project size classifications, F (5, 651) = 8.173 (p < 0.5). The 340 
results of Tukey’s HSD post hoc test indicated that difference existed between projects less than 341 
₤10 million and those with a ‘Final Approved Budget’ exceeding this value. In examining the 342 
association between cost overruns and project, a Pearson’s correlation (r) was computed (Table 2). 343 
The correlation analysis revealed that cost overruns and project size were significantly related (p 344 
< 0.01). Thus, smaller projects in this sample were prone to higher cost overruns than larger ones. 345 
Contrastingly, Levene’s test of homogeneity of the variances were found to be violated (p < 0.5) 346 
17 
 
for cost underruns, which indicated the population variances for each group of project size were 347 
equal, as the ANOVA revealed, F (5, 430) = 1.541 (p < 0.5). 348 
 349 
Other than project size, previous research has identified that ‘location’, ‘purpose’, ‘partner’ and 350 
‘scope’ do not significantly vary with water infrastructure projects (Baccarini and Love, 2014). 351 
However, the sample size in this research was considerably larger than previous studies (e.g. 352 
Baccarini and Love, 2014) and therefore differences between these variables were examined. As 353 
a result, the following was observed: 354 
 355 
• Partner (Division A, N=601 M=30.52% SD=25.11%; Division B, N=21, M = 11.88%, 356 
SD=23.1%; Division C, N=471, M=14.31%, SD=19.78%); 357 
• Location (North, N=191, M=15.61%, SD=20.42%; South, N=375, M=25.64%, SD=26.39%; 358 
East N=191, M=21.71%, SD=24.60; West, N=275, M=15.17%, SD=17.63%); 359 
• Purpose (General, N=44, M =27.22% SD=17.03%; Waste water N=491, M=16.68 360 
SD=21.31; Water N=558, M=23.19, SD=24.87); and 361 
• Scope (New build, N=1, M=10.57%; Refurbishment, N=1, M=1.01%, Upgrade, N=1093, 362 
M=20.2, 23.23%).  363 
Note, one replacement project was also undertaken, but this was delivered in accordance with the 364 
‘Final Approved Budget’. 365 
 366 
A one-way ANOVA was undertaken to determine if significant differences existed between the 367 
aforementioned variables and cost overruns. Levene’s test of homogeneity of the variances was 368 
found not to be violated for project scope (p < 0.5), which indicated the population variances for 369 
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each group of project size were equal. For the following variables, however, Levene’s test of 370 
homogeneity of the variances was found to be violated (p < 0.5), which indicated the population 371 
variances within their group project size were not equal: 372 
 373 
• Location: The ANOVA revealed significant differences between the ‘location’ and the mean 374 
cost overrun experienced F(3,653) = 8.952, p < 0.05. The results of Tukey’s HSD post hoc 375 
test indicated that difference existed between projects delivered between ‘general’ and 376 
‘waste’ projects (p <0.5); 377 
• Purpose: The ANOVA revealed significant differences between the ‘purpose’ and the mean 378 
cost overrun experienced F(2,654) = 6.485, p < 0.05. The results of Tukey’s HSD post-hoc 379 
test indicated that difference existed between projects delivered between ‘north’ and ‘south’ 380 
of the region (p <0.5); and 381 
• Partner: The ANOVA revealed significant differences between the ‘purpose’ and the mean 382 
cost overrun experienced F(2,654) = 41.320, p < 0.05. The results of Tukey’s HSD post-hoc 383 
test indicated that difference existed between ‘Division A’ and ‘C’ of the client’s 384 
organization that were charged with delivering projects (p <0.5). 385 
 386 
In the case of cost underruns, the ANOVA analysis revealed that Levene’s test of variance for 387 
‘location’, ‘purpose’ and ‘partner’ was found not to be violated (p < 0.5), which demonstrated that 388 
these variables do not significantly influence the propensity for assets to be delivered under budget. 389 
Typically at the beginning of a financial year, a budget for a program of infrastructure works is 390 
established. Stringent budgetary controls are invariably be put in place to ensure that the budget 391 
for these works are not be exceeded. In addition, projects are be prioritized in accordance with pre-392 
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defined criteria. If prioritized projects begin to experience a cost increase, then the scope of other 393 
projects may be reduced or only part of the works completed with the remainder, perhaps, being 394 
allocated to the next financial year.  395 
 396 
For the dataset presented herein, the ‘Approved Final Budget’ for projects M=₤1,259,176; 397 
SD=₤6,117,125, and for the ‘Final Construction Cost’ M=₤1,376,055; SD=₤5,891,590. A t-test 398 
was undertaken to examine if there was a significant difference between the ‘Approved Final 399 
Budget’ and ‘Final Construction Cost’. At the 95% confidence interval, no significant difference 400 
was found. Thus, in the context of cost performance for this sample of 1,093 projects, it concluded 401 
that the ‘Approved Final Budget’ was a reliable estimate of the ‘Final Construction Cost’.   402 
 403 
Cost Performance 404 
The ‘best fit’ probability distribution for ‘cost performance’ was examined using the ‘Goodness of 405 
Fit’ tests: Kolmogorov-Smirnov (D), Anderson-Darling (A2) and Chi-square (χ2). The results of the 406 
‘Goodness of Fit’ tests revealed that an unbounded Cauchy distribution with parameters σ = 4.31, 407 
μ = 3.47 was identified as the ‘best fit’ solution for examining the cost performance of the sample.  408 
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test revealed a D statistic of 0.03559 with a P-value of 0.12241. The 409 
Anderson-Darling statistic A2 was revealed to be 3.8536 and Chi-squared statistic (χ2) 72.585 with 410 
a p-value of 1.4013E-11. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test accepted the H0 for the sample 411 
distribution’s ‘best fit’ at the critical nominated α values (Table 3), though this was not the case for 412 
the Anderson-Darling test.  The PDF and CDF for the Cauchy distribution are presented in Figures 413 
5 and 6. 414 
 415 
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An unbounded Cauchy distribution has a positive excess kurtosis and is leptokurtic. It also has an 416 
acute peak around the mean (that is, a lower probability than a normally distributed variable of 417 
values near the mean).  With this distribution, σ is the continuous scale parameter (σ >0) and μ 418 
continuous location parameter. The domain for this distribution is expressed as -∞ < x < + ∞. The 419 
probabilities for cost performance’ were then determined using the Cauchy PDF function which is 420 
defined as: 421 
𝐹𝐹(𝑥𝑥) =   �𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋 �1 + �𝑥𝑥− 𝜇𝜇
𝜎𝜎
�
2
��
−1
                                                          [Eq.8] 422 
The CDF is expressed as: 423 
 424 
𝐹𝐹(𝑥𝑥) = 1
𝜋𝜋
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛 �
𝑥𝑥−𝜇𝜇
𝜎𝜎
� + 0.5       [Eq.9] 425 
Using the Cauchy PDF the probability of obtaining a cost performance < M -0.77% of the ‘Final 426 
Approved Budget’ was 41%. In addition, the probability of obtaining between 5 and 10% increase 427 
in CAPEX is 12%. Notably, the probability of attaining < 5% increase in CAPEX is 57%, and > 428 
10% was 31%. 429 
 430 
Cost Overruns 431 
The results of the ‘Goodness of Fit’ tests revealed that a Johnson SB distribution with 432 
parameters γ = 1.1057, δ = 0.48993, λ = 97.649, and   ξ = 0.45619  was identified as the ‘best fit’ 433 
solution for examining the ‘cost overruns’. Notably, γ  and δ  ( δ > 0) are a continuous shape 434 
parameters, λ continuous scale parameter (λ > 0) and ξ a continuous location parameter. The 435 
domain for this distribution is expressed as ξ ≤ x ≤ ξ +λ.  The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test revealed 436 
a D statistic of 0.04362 with a P-value of 0.15928 the Anderson-Darling statistic A2 was revealed 437 
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to be 48.387.  The ‘Goodness of Fit’ tests were accepted the H0 for the sample distribution’s ‘best 438 
fit’ at the critical nominated α values for Anderson-Darling test and at α =0.2 for the Kolmogorov-439 
Smirnov test (Table 3).  The PDF and CDF for the Johnson SB are presented in Figures 7 and 8. 440 
 441 
The Johnson SB is a bounded distribution (alternatively known as the four-parameter lognormal 442 
model) typically used as a candidate for variates constrained by extreme values (Flynn, 2006). It 443 
is part of a system of distributions, developed by Johnson (1949), which are generated by methods 444 
of translation on a standard normal variate that permits representation over the whole possible 445 
region of the plane (β1,β2), where β1 is the square of the standardized measure of skewness and β2 446 
is the standardized measure of kurtosis. The Johnson SB has two properties that ensure it is well-447 
suited to represent the cost overruns for this sample of projects:  448 
 449 
(1) lower bound, ξ,  and upper bound, ξ + λ, for the PDF can represent financial constraints that 450 
are imposed by the organization due to an annual budget that is established for its portfolio 451 
of infrastructure projects. Naturally ξ + λ, would be established at the ‘Approved Final 452 
Budget’ depending on the nature of the work to be undertaken and completeness of the 453 
engineering design and documentation;  454 
(2) the shape parameters (γ  and δ ) allow a considerable amount of flexibility to fit a broad 455 
spectrum of distributions (Fonseca et al., 2009). The parameters of the Johnson SB PDF can 456 
be estimated by the percentile method, maximum likelihood, moments and linear and non-457 
linear regression methods (Zhang et al., 2003). The Johnson SB PDF function is defined as: 458 
𝑓𝑓(𝑥𝑥) = 𝛿𝛿
𝜆𝜆√2𝜋𝜋𝑧𝑧(1−𝑧𝑧) exp �− 12 �𝛾𝛾 + 𝛿𝛿In � 𝑧𝑧1−𝑧𝑧��2�   [Eq.10] 459 
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Where 𝑧𝑧 ≡ 𝑥𝑥−𝜉𝜉
𝜆𝜆
. The CDF is expressed as: 460 
𝑓𝑓(𝑥𝑥) = Φ�𝛾𝛾 + 𝛿𝛿In � 𝑧𝑧
1−𝑧𝑧
��      [Eq.11] 461 
Φ is the Laplace Integral, which is defined as: 462 
     Φ(𝑥𝑥) = 1
√2𝜋𝜋
∫ 𝑒𝑒−𝑡𝑡/2𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡𝑥𝑥0    [Eq.12] 463 
𝑡𝑡 is a real number. The probabilities for cost overruns being incurred when underruns are excluded 464 
from the sample are presented in Table 4. The probability of a cost overrun being < M of 19.99% 465 
is 66%. Moreover, the probability of a 50 % cost overrun being > is 12%. 466 
 467 
Cost Underruns 468 
Cost underruns formed an integral part of this dataset and thus are analyzed separately to 469 
understand their distribution and the likelihood of their occurrence within the organization’s 470 
portfolio of projects. The ‘Goodness of Fit’ tests: Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Anderson-Darling 471 
were undertaken. The results of the ‘Goodness of Fit’ tests revealed that Wakeby distribution 472 
provided the best fit for the dataset.  The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test revealed a D-statistic of 473 
0.02263 with a p-value of 0.97517 for the sample of 436 water infrastructure projects (Table 3).  474 
The Anderson-Darling statistic A2 was revealed to be 53.421.  The PDF and CDF for the Wakeby 475 
distribution are presented in Figures 9 and 10. 476 
 477 
The Wakeby is a form of Generalized Extreme Value distribution.  The parameters of a Wakeby, 478 
α β γ δ ξ are all continuous.  The domain for this distribution is expressed as , if  and 479 
,  if  or . The distribution parameters for the range were α = 480 
x≤ξ ≥δ
0>γ δγβαξ −+≤≤ x 0<δ 0=γ
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1936.7, β = 11.372, γ = 78.309, δ =-1.6536, ξ=-218.09.   The Wakeby distribution is defined by the 481 
quantile function (i.e. inverse CDF): 482 
 483 
 𝑥𝑥(𝐹𝐹) = 𝜉𝜉 + 𝛼𝛼
𝛽𝛽
�1 − (1 − 𝐹𝐹)𝛽𝛽� − 𝜆𝜆
𝛿𝛿
�1 − (1 − 𝐹𝐹)−𝛿𝛿�   [Eq.13] 484 
Table 4 presents the probability of cost overruns being experienced. The probability of a cost 485 
underrun being < M of -32.0% is 28%. Moreover, the probability of a -50% cost overrun being 486 
experienced > is 81%. 487 
 488 
Discussion 489 
The homogenous dataset of water infrastructure projects delivered by a water authority using a 490 
common contractual delivery method has enabled the results that were obtained to be compared to 491 
the research reported in Baccarini and Love (2014). In stark contrast to Baccarini and Love (2014), 492 
statistical differences in the ‘cost performance’ were found for ‘location’, ‘purpose’ and the body 493 
within water authority charged with delivering the respective project within the specified location. 494 
As noted above, this may be due to the size of the sample, though the M ‘cost performance’ 495 
significantly differed between the studies reported within Baccarini and Love (2014) who reported 496 
5.12% (SD=25.95) cost increase compared to -0.77% (SD=41.92) of the ‘Final Approved Budget’ 497 
in this study. Bearing in mind the significant differences in the mean and the reported standard 498 
deviations, there would naturally be differences between the comparative empirical and ‘best fit’ 499 
distributions.  500 
 501 
For ‘cost performance’, Baccarini and Love (2014) computed a Generalized Logistic distribution, 502 
which is similar to a Normal distribution but possesses a higher kurtosis value, due to extreme 503 
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values. This type of distribution is unbounded (i.e. has a range of -∞ < x < + ∞) like the Cauchy 504 
that was revealed for ‘cost performance’ in this study. Baccarini and Love (2014) did not 505 
differentiate between cost overruns and underruns in their analysis and therefore the distribution 506 
they suggested does not actually reflect the propensity for cost overruns to arise, but simply to the 507 
sample at large. The research presented in this paper suggests that cost overruns and underruns 508 
need to be explicitly separated and analyzed independently so as to better determine their 509 
likelihood of occurrence for improved risk management. From previous studies undertaken, it 510 
would appear that cost overruns and underruns have been combined and juxtaposed with 511 
heterogeneous samples, which has distorted their predictions (e.g. Flyvbjerg and Cowi, 2004). 512 
 513 
Cost Overruns 514 
For cost overruns, the Johnson SB offers an approach for estimating extreme values and this is 515 
particularly useful when undertaking risks assessments at ‘Final Approved Budget’, considering 516 
what has previously transpired within the sample and reported in the findings of Baccarini and 517 
Love (2014). The quantile and ‘method of moments’ (i.e. estimation of population parameters) 518 
employ analytic expressions for the moments and their numerical integration is therefore not 519 
required (Johnson et al., 1994).  The Johnson SB is a flexible four-parameter probability model that 520 
soundly characterizes variates bound by extreme values, or simply expressed as ratios. Rather than 521 
being unbounded like those reported in previous cost overrun studies (e.g. Love et al., 2013), this 522 
distribution is bounded, as water authorities have limited budgets and therefore while some 523 
projects may be of the utmost importance, their scope can be changed to limit the excessive amount 524 
of overrun that is incurred.  525 
 526 
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There are challenges with using this distribution due to its mathematical complexity and the lack 527 
of effective maximum likelihood methods when three or four parameters are required to be 528 
estimated (Flynn, 2005). However, the results presented are considered to be a reasonable 529 
approximation for the data that was modelled and with larger datasets the estimation of parameters 530 
will, no doubt, improve over time. When the moments of the Johnson SB are hard to obtain, then 531 
the parameters can also be difficult to determine for the purposes of risk analysis. Hence, a three-532 
dimensional Levenberg-Marquardt algorithm may be applied in this instance to solve the 533 
parameters (Nocedal and Wright, 2005). The Leven-Marquardt is an alternative to the Gauss-534 
Newton method of finding the minimum of a function F(x) that is the sum of squares of nonlinear 535 
functions and is expressed as: 536 
( )[ ]∑
=
=
m
i
i xfxF
1
2
2
1)(        [Eq.14] 537 
𝑚𝑚 is a set of empirical datum pairs (𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖, 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖) of the independent and dependent variables. Let the 538 
Jacobian of ( )xfi  be denoted ( )xJi , then the Leven-Marquardt method searches in the direction 539 
given by p to the equations: 540 
( ) kTkpkkkTk fJJJ −=Ι+ λ       [Eq.15] 541 
where kλ are non-negative scalar and Ι is the identity matrix. The method has the nice property 542 
that, for some scalar ∆  related to kλ , the vector kp is the solution of the constrained sub-problem 543 
of minimizing 22
2kk
fpJ +  subject to ∆≤2p (Gill et al., 1981;p.136). 544 
 545 
Cost Underruns 546 
26 
 
Cost overruns have been regularly equated with the presence of optimism bias, yet the opposite is 547 
pessimism bias, which has remained absent from the construction and engineering literature (Love 548 
et al., 2015). Pessimism bias is the tendency to exaggerate the likelihood that negative things will 549 
occur. In this case, this may have arisen if a series of projects were overrunning and future works 550 
that need to be undertaken by the asset owner were subjected to drastic changes in their scope in 551 
order to control CAPEX for the portfolio. It can be seen that significant reductions from the ‘Final 552 
Approved Budget’ and ‘Final Construction Cost’ were evident in this particular sample of projects. 553 
This view is simply conjectured, as no direct evidence was made available to the researchers. 554 
However, it is a worthy area for future investigation considering the lack of empirical work in this 555 
domain. Thus, it is suggested that ‘cost underruns’ are just as important to examine as ‘cost 556 
overruns’, especially for asset owners who are managing a series of projects and trying to ‘balance’ 557 
their yearly financial budgets. 558 
 559 
Research Limitations  560 
The research presented in this paper has focused on profiling cost overruns as well as underruns 561 
for an asset owner who supplies water infrastructure within the UK. The dataset was homogenous 562 
and therefore the probability distributions developed may not be generalizable. In addition, the 563 
research did not focus on the causes of cost overruns or underruns. While a causal explanation 564 
provides a context and assists with understanding the problem at hand, the issue is complex.  565 
 566 
Determining the cause of an overrun is fraught with ambiguity as researchers invariably sieve 567 
through the available evidence and look for fragments of information that seem to point to a 568 
common cause in developing a priori explanation. Moreover, details that are relevant to explaining 569 
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the actions and behaviors of people can be overlooked and the information collated is meaningless 570 
outside the context where it originated. Invariably the pieces of information obtained are combined 571 
with those of a similar nature, though it may have its own context and raison d'etre. Context is 572 
therefore needed to understand why projects were subjected to both cost overruns and underruns 573 
and it is an issue that will be examined in future research using situational sense-making and 574 
probabilistic theory. The acquisition of such understanding will then provide the basis for the 575 
establishment of reliable benchmarks and probabilities. 576 
 577 
Conclusions 578 
Asset owners who regularly procure, maintain and operate infrastructure are required to manage 579 
the portfolio of projects that they undertake to ensure annual financial budgets meet their pre-580 
defined objectives. Yet, there has been a tendency to use deterministic approaches to manage risks, 581 
particularly the construction contingency, which has not been able to accommodate the uncertainty 582 
that may arise during on-site operations.  583 
 584 
Using a dataset for a homogenous asset class of water infrastructure projects provided by a large 585 
public utility company in the UK, a profile of their cost performance was examined and the 586 
probability of overruns and underruns occurring was determined. The analysis revealed that the 587 
mean ‘cost performance’ of projects was -0.77% of the ‘Final Approved Budget’; that is, on 588 
average underruns were experienced. A Cauchy distribution was found to provide the ‘best fit’ 589 
distribution for cost performance. The combining of cost overruns and underruns datasets to 590 
determine the likelihood of their occurrence can be unreliable as it does not provide an assessment 591 
of the maximum-likelihood estimation required to produce estimates for the parameters of the ‘best 592 
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fit’ model for developing a realistic construction cost contingency.  By separating the dataset, the 593 
mean cost overrun was found to be 19.97% of ‘Final Budget Approval’, and with a ‘best fit’ 594 
distribution being a Johnson SB. However, a mean underrun of -32% of ‘Final Approved Budget’ 595 
was obtained with a Wakeby ‘best fit’ distribution. The probability distributions that were 596 
established were then used to calculate the likelihood of their occurrence at various intervals. Such 597 
probabilities provide decision-makers with a reliable basis to determine an appropriate 598 
contingency level and therefore make a positive contribution to improving the management of risk.   599 
 600 
Further research is, however, required to test the reliability of the probability distributions with 601 
larger homogenous samples of projects rather than those of a heterogeneous nature. This will then 602 
enable the development of a decision-support system that can be used for managing risk within an 603 
asset owners’ project portfolio. Such a decision-support system would be integrated into the asset 604 
owners estimating, and strategic planning and procurement process enabling the practical 605 
applications of results presented in this paper. 606 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics for cost performance, overrun and underruns  
 
Statistic 
 
Cost Performance(₤) 
(N=1093) 
 
Cost Overruns (₤) 
(N=657) 
Cost Underruns (₤) 
(N=436) 
Range (%) 
 
331.43 98.74 232.65 
Mean (%) 
 
-0.77 19.973 -32.044 
Variance 
 
1724.2 538.85 1885.4 
Std. Deviation 
 
41.52 23.213 43.42 
Coef. of Variation 
 
-53.45 1.1622 -1.35 
Std. Error 
 
1.25 0.90563 2.07 
Skewness 
 
-1.65 1.4633 -2.22 
Excess Kurtosis 
 
6.21 1.243 4.74 
Min (%) 
 
-232.69 0 -232.69 
5% -72.89 0.828 -140.7 
10% -37.46 1.58 -85.84 
25% (Q1) 
 
-9.62 3.58 -37.49 
50% (Median) 
 
2.27 8.95 -15.79 
75% (Q3) 
 
13.08 29.59 -5.09 
90% 45.85 56.884 -1.62 
95% 62.63 70.008 -0.70 
Max (%) 98.74 98.74 -0.03 
 
 
Table 2. Correlations between key variables 
 
Variable Project Size Location Purpose Cost Underrun 
Cost 
Overrun 
Cost 
Performance Scope Partner 
Project Size 1        
Location .027 1       
Purpose -.016 -.048 1      
Cost Underrun -.013 -.081 .016 1     
Cost Overrun .28** -.032 .12** -.50** 1    
Cost 
Performance .017 -.002 -.046 -.040 -.15
** 1   
Scope .13** -.031 -.003 .016 .031 -.010 1  
Partner -.327** -.177** -.057 -.001 -.33** .13** .03 1 
 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
          
 
Table 3. Goodness of Fit Tests 
 
Distribution Type  
 
Sig. 
α 
Level 
Kolmogorov-
Smirnov (D) 
Critical Value 
Anderson 
Darling (A2) 
Critical 
Value 
Chi-squared 
(χ2) 
Critical 
Value 
Cauchy 
Cost Performance  
(N=1093) 
 
 
0.2 0.03246 1.3749 13.442 
0.1 0.03699 1.9286 15.987 
0.05 0.04108 2.5018 18.307 
0.02 0.04592 3.2992 21.161 
0.01 0.04927 3.9074 23.209 
Johnson SB 
Cost Overruns 
(N=657) 
 
0.2 0.4186 1.3749 N/A 
0.1 0.04771 1.9286 N/A 
0.05 0.05298 2.5018 N/A 
0.02 0.05922 3.2892 N/A 
0.01 0.06355 3.9074 N/A 
Wakeby 
Cost Underruns  
(N=436) 
 
0.2 0.05139 1.3749 N/A 
0.1 0.05857 1.9286 N/A 
0.05 0.6504 2.5018 N/A 
0.02 0.0727 3.2892 N/A 
0.01 0.07801 3.9074 N/A 
 
 
Table 4. Example of discrete probabilities for cost overruns/underruns 
Final Approved Budget 
(₤ million) 
 
Probability  P(X < X1) P(X > X1) P(X1< X < X2) P(X < X2) P(X >X2) 
Johnson SB 
Cost Overruns 
(N=657) 
 
 
1 and 10% 0.07 0.93 0.43 0.51 0.49 
11 and 20% 0.52 0.48 0.13 0.66 0.34 
21 and 30% 0.67 0.33 0.08 0.75 0.25 
31 and 40% 0.76 0.24 0.05 0.82 0.18 
41 and 50% 0.82 0.18 0.04 0.86 0.14 
51 and 60% 0.87 0.13 0.03 0.90 0.10 
Wakey 
Cost Underruns 
(N=436) 
 
 
-1 and -10% 0.93 0.07 - - - 
-11 and -20% 0.59 0.41 - - - 
-21 and -30% 0.40 0.60 - - - 
-31 and -40% 0.28 0.72 - - - 
-41 and -50% 0.22 0.78 - - - 
-51 and -60% 0.18 0.82 - - - 
 
 
 Figure 1. Logarithmic distribution of cost performance 
 
 
 Figure 2. Mean cost overrun for the sampled projects 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Mean cost underrun for the sampled projects 
 
 
 
 Figure 4.Cauchy: PDF for cost performance 
 
 
  
Figure 5. Cauchy: CDF for cost performance 
 
 
 
  
Figure 6. Johnson SB: PDF for cost overruns 
 
 
  
Figure 7. Johnson SB: CDF for cost overruns 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 8. Wakeby: PDF for cost underruns 
 
 
 Figure 9. Wakeby: CDF for cost underruns 
 
 
